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NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
CHARLES B. ROBISON, Case Editor
JURISDICTION-JUVENILE COURT V.
CRIMINAL COURT.- [Illinois] De-
fendant, a fifteen year old girl, was
found guilty of murder and sen-
tenced to imprisonment by the
criminal court of Cook county.
Prior to the trial, the juvenile court
of Cook county, acting pursuant to
the "Juvenile Court Act" (ILL. STATE
BAR STAT. (1935) c. 23, §319), had
declared the defendant delinquent
on the basis of other misconduct.
Defendant contended that wards of
the juvenile court were not to be
tried without its consent because
Section 9a of the Juvenile Court
Act provides that "The court may
in its discretion in any case of a
delinquent child permit such child
to be proceeded against in accor-
dance with the laws that may be
in force in this state governing the
commission of crimes." On appeal,
affirmed. Held: "The legislature is
without power to confer upon an
inferior court the power to stay a
court created by the constitution
from proceeding with the trial of a
cause jurisdiction of which is ex-
pressly granted to it by the con-
stitution." See ILL. CONST., Art. VI,
§26. Moreover, the legislature did
not attempt to confer such power;
Section 9a, like many sections in
the Act, has reference only to cases
pending before the juvenile court
in which the issue of delinquency
is undecided. It is then that the
juvenile court judge may, in his
discretion, either declare the child
delinquent or transfer the case to
the criminal court. People v. Lar-
rimore, 362 Ill. 206, 199 N. E. 275
(1935).
On the day of the Larrimore de-
cision the court also held in People
v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 229, 199 N. E. 276
(1935), that Section 10 of the Juv-
enile Court Act providing that "In
any case, the court shall require
notice to be given and investigation
to be made as in other cases under
this act . . . ." did not prevent it
from following the Larrimore
decision, since the notice referred
to was clearly notice to be given
by, rather than to, the juvenile
court. The sweeping language of
the Lewis opinion makes clearer
that it is unimportant whether
the child be declared delinquent
before the commission of the crime,
or after the crime but before the
indictment, or after the indictment
but before the trial.
By these decisions the court has
completed its overthrow of the
dictum in People v. Fitzgerald, 322
Ill. 54, 152 N. E. 542 (1926), where,
in affirming the conviction of a boy
for rape, it was stated that if the
boy had been a ward of the juven-
ile court prosecution would depend
upon its consent. People v. Bruno,
[448]. 1;>
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346 Ill. 449, 179 N. E. 129 (1931),
had already cast doubt on the
validity of the Fitzgerald dictum.
Bruno, a ward at the time of his
conviction by the criminal court,
sought thereafter to raise this juris-
dictional point by a writ of coram
nobis. It was held by the court
that the writ furnished no relief
from the consequences of a neg-
ligent defense. The difficulty in-
herent in the position taken by the
court is that the question of neg-
ligence should be irrelevant in de-
termining whether the criminal
court has jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter. See Note (1932) 20
Ill. L. Rev. 901 (able discussion of
these cases and correct prophecy of
the result of the instant case by
Mr. Riley).
For at least two reasons little
fault should be found with the in-
terpretation placed upon Section
9a by the court, though it destroys
the effectiveness of the section.
The section is ambiguous, and
furthermore the constitution pre-
cludes an opposite holding irre-
spective of how Section 9a be con-
strued. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that the drafters of this
amendment were aware they were
not conferring exclusive jurisdic-
tion over delinquent children upon
the juvenile court. Note that other
amendments to Section 9, passed
at the same time as Section 9a,
deal with the care of children after
a declaration of delinquency. Cer-
tainly Julian W. Mack, early ju-
venile court judge, implies that the
court was given exclusive jurisdic-
tion, and, when the purpose of ju-
venile court legislation is taken into
account, such an interpretation
seems plausible. See Mack, The
Juvenile Court (1909) 23 Harv. L.
Rev. 104 at 109; RILEY, A WORKING
MANUAL FOR JUVENILE COURT OF-
FICFS (1932) 35. Nor would such
a holding, as the court believes,
render meaningless the last part of
Section 9a. That part would simply
not be permitted to limit the pre-
ceding, nor the spirit of the sec-
tion. However, the last part of
Section 9a does make the contrary
reasoning of the court very tenable,
if not inevitable-particularly in
view of the rule that, if possible,
an ambiguous statute should be
construed as constitutional.
The proposition that a constitu-
tional court may not be stayed from
proceeding with the trial of a cause
over which it has been given juris-
diction by the constitution is sound;
whether the interfering court be
inferior or also constitutional is im-
material. People v. Warren, 260
Ill. 297, 103 N. E. 248 (1913) (over-
ruled by People v. Feinberg, 348
II. 549, 181 N. E. 437 (1932) only
insofar as it follows Berkowitz v.
Lester, 121 Ill. 99, 11 N. E. 860
(1887)). The court in the Lewis
opinion stated that the facts did
not make it necessary to decide
what the result would be if the
charge against the defendant pend-
ing in the juvenile court was the
same as the charge against him in
the criminal court. By the reason-
ing of the instant decisions it would
seem, however, that if the criminal
court had obtained jurisdiction
over the person in such a case,
nothing could bar a prosecution.
The possibility that perhaps the
juvenile court had retained juris-
diction over the defendants in the
instant cases until they reached
twenty-one was not discussed by
the court. See Hamerick v. People,
126 Ill. App. 491 (1906). Else-
where it has been properly held
that where juvenile court legisla-
tion continues the jurisdiction after
a declaration of delinquency, it
was not contemplated that this
should prevent criminal prosecu-
tion. If such were contemplated,
the section would be unconstitu-
tional as an unreasonable and arbi-
trary criminal provision. State v.
Pence, 303 Mo. 598, 262 S. W. 360
(1924); cf. §1 of the Juvenile Court
Act. The court in the instant cases
could have eliminated the consti-
tutional obstacle to an opposite
holding only by the strained con-
struction that the jurisdiction given
the criminal court was impliedly
limited by the inherent right of the
state to act as parens patriae.
That the Juvenile Court Act did
not repeal by implication the sec-
tions of the criminal code providing
that children above ten years are
capable of crime (ILL. STATE BAR
STATS. (1935) c. 38, §§619, 620) is
clear since the Act is not criminal
legislation, and also because to be
ieasonable the Act must repeal
criminal jurisdiction whether or
not the child be a ward of the ju-
venile court. Nothing in the Act
supports the latter position, and it
is contrary to the holding in Peo-
ple v. Fitzgerald, supra. See also
People v. Fisher, 303 Ill. 430, 135
N. E. 751 (1922).
Typical provisions in the ju-
venile court acts of other states
stipulate that the juvenile court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases; or that the jurisdiction
shall be exclusive in the discretion
of the juvenile judge; or that the
child shall be prosecuted for seri-
ous crimes only; or that the child
shall be prosecuted only after a
finding by the juvenile judge of
hopeless incorrigibility. It is ap-
parent that if this type provision
were passed by the Illinois legis-
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lature, it would be invalid when
invoked to support a "lack of jur-
isdiction" defense to prosecution in
a criminal court of Illinois. On
this problem generally, see 1
WHARTON, CRIINIAL LAW (12th ed.
1932) §§369, 371, 375; MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAW (1934) c. 1, §lr, c.
8, §34c; ELLIOTT, CONFLICTING PENAL
THEORIES IN STATUTORY CRIMINAL
LAW (1931) cc. 3, 4, 5; Flexner and
Oppenheimer, The Legal Aspect of
the Juvenile Court (1923) 57 Am.
L. Rev. 65 at 75, 79; (1935) 20 St.
Louis L. Rev. 282; (1929) 14 St.
Louis L. Rev. 429. However, it is
interesting to note that the major-
ity of state constitutions, unlike
Illinois, vest the judicial power in
a supreme court, circuit courts, and
such other courts as the legislature
may establish. If such a constitu-
tion also leaves the apportionment
of jurisdiction to the legislature,
the constitutional question of the
instant case could not arise. At
best there would be merely a statu-
tory conflict between the criminal
code and the juvenile court act.
It is reasonable to suppose that
the problem is not so apt to de-
velop where the court having crim-
inal jurisdiction over the child also
has juvenile court powers.
There will naturally be disagree-
ment as to the effect and policy of
the instant decisions. It must be
remembered that. juvenile court
legislation has been sustained on
the ground that it is legislation en-
acted by the state as parens patriae.
See People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453,
114 N. E. 145 (1916); Lindsay v.
Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892
(1913); HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE
ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW
(1907); FLEXNER AND BALDWIN,
JUVENILE COURTS AND PROBATION
(1914) pt. 1. As it is not criminal
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legislation (Witter v. County Com-
missioners of Cook County, 256 Ill.
616, 100 N. E. 148 (1912)), the con-
stitution does not require that the
right of trial by jury be preserved
in delinquency cases. See §2 of the
Juvenile Court Act. Cf. (1933) 22
Ill. Bar J. 117; (1933) 10 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 398. It follows also
that the juvenile court, a part of
the circuit court of Cook County
(Lindsay v. Lindsay, supra), does
not contravene the rule of People
v. Feinberg, supra, that the crim-
inal courts of Cook County has ex-
clusive, rather than concurrent
criminal jurisdiction with the cir-
cuit court.
To many the instant decisions
will seem a backward step, a frus-
tration of the purpose behind ju-
venile court legislation of insuring
a humane and understanding han-
dling of each delinquent by a spe-
cial court. See Lou, JUvENmE
COURTS IN THE U. S. (1927) 42;
STANDARD JUVENILE COURT LAW at
232, §§5, 11, 12. Note also that
Congress in 1932 provided that
children accused of federal crimes
should be transferred to state ju-
venile courts. 47 STAT. 301 (1933),
18 U. S. C. A. §662a (1935); Wah-
renbrock, State Juvenile Court
Procedure for Federal Juvenile
Offenders (1931) 30 Mich. L. Rev.
113. See also Ex parte Januszewski.
196 Fed. 123 (1911). Such thought,
however, probably overlooks the
fact that the administrators of the
criminal law will seldom desire to
obstruct the valuable work of the
juvenile court, as well as the im-
portance to the welfare of society
of retaining the moral law, and
threat of punishment. See Note
(1926) 21 Ill. L. Rev. 375. An
amendment to the criminal code
creating a conclusive presumption
that children under twenty-one are
incapable of crime would give the
juvenile court exclusive jurisdic-
tion. See (1920) 91 Cent. L. J. 78,
and Miller v. Brown, 31 Utah 473,
88 Pac. 609 (1907). An amend-
ment stating that children under
twenty-one were prima facie in-
capable of crime, but that the ju-
venile judge could find them cap-
able and transfer them to the crim-
inal court would likely be held
unconstitutional as an attempt to
restrict the jurisdiction of the crim-
inal court.
JACK L. O'DoNNELL.
EMBEZZLEMENT - ]PROSECUTION OF
RETAIR FOR FAILURE TO TURN
OvER GAS TAx.--[Wisconsin] De-
fendant was licensed as a dealer in
motor fuel oil. He was charged
and convicted of embezzlement of
moneys belonging to the state, col-
lected by him from purchasers
paying the motor fuel tax imposed
by statute. The statute provided
that any dealer who fails to pay the
tax should be guilty of a misde-
meanor punishable only by fine.
Defendant contended that a debtor-
creditor relationship existed, and
that the sole penalty was that pro-
vided by the statute. On appeal,
affirmed. Held: The relationship
between the defendant and the
state was that of principal and
agent, and he was thus properly
convicted of embezzlement. An-
derson v. State, 265 N. W. 210
(Wis. 1936).
This case followed the almost
identical case of a conviction of
embezzlement for failure to turn
over the gas tax in Illinois. Peo-
ple v. Kopman, 358 Ill. 479, 193 N.
E. 516 (1934). Both courts rea-
soned that the statute imposed an
agency relationship upon the re-
tailer, making him a fiduciary to
collect the tax and to turn it over
to the state. The Wisconsin statute
explicitly provides that the tax
collected shall be held in trust in
a separate fund for the sole use of
the state. As an abstract proposi-
tion of law, then, the relationship
might be such as to warrant a con-
viction for embezzlement.
But there can be no doubt that
the two courts have stretched the
basic concept of embezzlement.
That crime has always required the
breach of a trust or fiduciary re-
lationship on the part of the agent.
Raine v. State, 143 Tenn. 168, 226
S. W. 189 (1920); State v. Berdell,
87 Tex. Cr. Rep. 310, 220 S. W. 1101
(1920). The existence of a fiduci-
ary relationship is essential. Peo-
ple v. Heinzeman, 351 II. 402, 184
N. E. 600 (1933). It seems obvious
that the relative trust and confi-
dence of each retailer is not con-
sidered either by the state or by
the purchaser. If courts will sus-
tain a conviction for embezzlement
in such a situation as this, the road
is left open for their legislature, by
the use of a few words, to make
every retailer an agent of the state
to collect the "sales" tax, thus sub-
jecting him to the possibility of
being indicted for embezzlement if
he does not turn the money in
promptly. A much more common
sense view of this matter would
be to regard the relationship as one
of debtor-creditor, and not to put
retailers in a category different




dent having testified in a criminal
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proceeding, was ordered by the
trial judge to appear and answer
questions concerning the truth of
certain of his statements. Upon
inquiry, respondent admitted that
he had testified falsely, whereupon
the court committed him for con-
tempt. On appeal, reversed. Held:
No additional testimony in a sub-
sequent proceeding is permitted to
prove the falsity of the statements
questioned. People v. La Scola,
282 Il. App. 328 (1935).
Although to testify falsely often
constitutes perjury (see ILL. STATE
BAR STATS. (1935) c. 38, §482), it
likewise has been declared to be
"undoubtedly a great contempt of
court." Stockham v. French, 130
Eng. Rep. 147 (1823); Ex parte
Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378 (1919);
United States v. Dachis, 36 F. (2d)
601 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); Berkson v.
People, 154 Ill. 81, 39 N. E. 1079
(1894). Indeed, one court found
it "difficult to see why the penalty
for each offense should not be im-
posed." In re Steiner, 195 Fed.
299, 302 (S. D. N. Y. 1912). False
swearing has been made punish-
able as contempt by statute in at
least one jurisdiction (see People
v. Fourquet, 17 Porto Rico 1037
(1911)), and in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings it is punishable under §41
of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT.
556 (1890), 11 U. S. C. A. §69
(1927); see (1921) 11 A. L. R. 344
and cases cited.
In the ordinary case, however,
because the power may be exer-
cised summarily, certain limita-
tions have been placed upon its use
as a means of punishing perjury.
United States v. McGovern, 60 F.
(2d) 880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Peo-
ple v. Paynter, 250 Ill. App. 235
(1930); People v.* Berrell, 216 Ill.
App. 341 (1920). In the first place,
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since the power to punish for con-
tempt is a defensive weapon of the
court to protect its dignity and the
administration of justice, it is an
almost universal requirement that
the false testimony be obstructive
(Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1
(1933) noted in (1933) 28 Ill. L.
Rev. 292, (1933) 24 J. Crim. L. 446,
(1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 850; Peo-
ple v. Freeman, 256 Ill. App. 423
(1928)), this element being re-
quired in addition to those neces-
sary to support a charge of perjury.
Ex parte Hudgings, supra; Blank-
enburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass.
25, 172 N. E. 209 (1930); but see In
re Bronstein, 182 Fed. 349 (S. D.
N. Y. 1910); In re Fellerman, 149
Fed. 244 (S. D. N. Y. 1906). Of
greater importance, however, is
the requirement that the falsity be
evident to the court from its judi-
cial knowledge. People v. Richman,
222 Ill. App. 147 (1921); People v.
Stone, 181 Ill. App. 475 (1913);
Riley v. Wallace, 188 Ky. 470, 22
S. W. 1085, 11 A. L. R. 342 (1920);
Hegelaw v. State, 24 Ohio 103, 155
N. E. 620 (1927); see Comment
(1933) 21 Calif. L. Rev. 582, 585.
If the testimony is obviously un-
true, the court may proceed sum-
marily (United States v. Appel, 211
Fed. 495 (S. D. N. Y. (1913);
Berkson v. People, supra); but if
its falsity is controverted or rests
upon a mere conclusion of the
judge the remedy is prosecution
for perjury-not commitment for
contempt. People v. Anderson, 272
Ill. App. 93 (1933). Judicial knowl-
edge of the falsity may be acquired
by the court from conflicting affi-
davits, or by admissions made by
the witness. People v. Freeman,
supra; People v. Hadesman, 223 Ill.
App. 219 (1921); People v. Gard,
259 Ill. 238 (1913); The Dunnegan
Sisters, 53 F. (2d) 502 (S. D. N. Y.
1932); Young v. State, 198 Ind. 629,
154 N. E. 478 (1926). Indeed, one
court in Illinois has required that
the untruth must have been dis-
closed by the witness himself and
not by the testimony of other wit-
nesses. People v. Hille, 192 Ill.
App. 139 (1915). Accord: Blank-
enburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass.
25, 172 N. E. 209 (1930); State v.
Meese, 200 Wis. 454, 229 N. W. 31
(1930). The instant case.adds still
a further requirement: The un-
truth must be disclosed on cross-
examination and not upon a sub-
sequent inquiry instituted by a
suspicious judge.
The insistence of the courts on
prosecutions for perjury, with the
attendant safeguard of jury trial
in all but exceptional cases, is to
be commended; but where an un-
truth of an obstructive nature has
been admitted by the witness him-
self, there seems to be little reason
to insist upon prosecution for per-
jury, convictions for which are
notoriously hard to obtain. In-
deed, as one writer has stated, even
the requirement that the statement
be judicially known to be false "is
not in harmony with the estab-
lished power of the courts to deal
with other contempts such as
newspaper libels on the court."
See Comment (1933) 21 Calif. L.
Rev. 582, 584. The fear that the
threat of summary punishment for
contempt might be used as an in-
quisitorial weapon to secure a de-
sired answer seems almost un-
founded.
Wn LAm HYNas.
199 YEAR SENTENCE-VALIDITy iN
LIGHT oF PA oLx LA.-[illinois]
Defendant was convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to a term of 199
years in prison. Under the Illinois
statute (ILL. STATE BAR STATS.
(1935) c. 38, §801) a prisoner un-
der a determinate sentence is not
eligible for parole until he has
served at least one-third of his
term. Contending that so long a
sentence was an attempt to cir-
cumvent the parole act, since it de-
prived him of any possible chance
of parole, defendant appealed. Af-
firmed. Held: The parole law does
not prevent a sentence of 199 years,
for that act is one of clemency, and
relates only to prison government
and discipline. People v. Pace, 362
II. 224, 198 N. E. 319 (1935).
It may well be that the legis-
lature did not consider the possi-
bility that so long a sentence might
be imposed, or that any criminal
might, by this device, seemingly be
deprived of all opportunity for
parole. But the wording of the
applicable statutes is so clear that
there seems to be no room for in-
terpretation, at least so far as the
validity of the original sentence is
concerned. Cf. Hickam v. People,
137 Ill. 75, 27 N. E. 88 (1891) (99
year sentence upheld). It is gen-
erally held improper for the prose-
cuting attorney to refer to the
parole laws in argument to the jury
for a drastic penalty, though taken
by itself such argument may not
be sufficient cause for reversal.
Farrell v. People, 133 Ill. 244, 24 N.
E. 423 (1890); People v. Murphy,
276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916).
But since the mental processes of
juries are generally not open to
examination to impeach their re-
sult, the inference that the jury,
without official prompting, prob-
ably did intend to circumvent the
parole law is not material. See 5
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WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§§2348-49.
Short of executive clemency, the
defendant's only hope must be the
rather strained construction of the
parole section that since persons
serving life sentences are eligible
for parole in twenty years the
legislature intended that no pris-
oner otherwise a suitable subject
for parole should be confined for a
longer period. Such a contention,
even if accepted, should not affect
the validity of the original sentence
and could not properly be passed




DER GENERAL OR SPECIAL GAlING
S T A T U T E - EJUSDEm GENERIS.-
[Texas] Defendant was tried and
convicted of keeping a place for
betting on horse races. The indict-
ment was framed under Article 625
of the Texas Penal Code which
states that any person who "shall
keep . . . any . . . place . . .
to bet or wager, or to gamble with
cards, dice or dominoes, . .. or
as a place where people resort to
gamble, bet or wager upon any-
thing whatever," shall be guilty of
a felony. A few years subsequent
to the passage of the Article the
legislature passed Article 649 pro-
viding for punishment as a misde-
meanor any "owner, agent or lessee
of any property" who permits the
same to be used as a place for bet-
ting on horse races. The evidence
showed that defendant kept a place
for betting on horse races but did
not show that he was an owner,
agent or lessee. Defendant con-
tended he should be punished for a
misdemeanor and not for a felony.
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On appeal, reversed. Held: The
second statute controls, being spe-
cial and embracing the same or
similar subject matter. Thomas v.
State, 91 S. W. (2d) 716 (Tex. Cr.
Rep. 1936).
The court stated that since the
first statute was general and the
latter pertained only to horse rac-
ing, it would supersede the first,
and substantiated its position by
saying that betting on horse racing
was not ejusdem generis with bet-
ting on cards, dice or dominoes.
Doubtless horse racing is not
ejusdem generis with cards, dice
or dominoes, but that argument
does not seem pertinent here. The
rule of ejusdem generis-that when
general words follow a series of
specific words, they must be held
to be qualified by and similar in
nature to the preceding specific
words-is merely a rule of con-
struction to be applied when the
language itself is ambiguous. United
States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393, 402
(1907). See also State v. Gros-
venor, 149 Tenn. 158, 258 S. W. 140
(1924), and other cases cited by
the dissent at 721. But the rule
should not be arbitrarily applied
where the section as a whole and
the popular feeling then prevailing
show the purpose of the legislation.
United States Cement Co. v.
Cooper, 172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69
(1909).
The statute here seems unam-
biguous when it condemns keeping
a place "to gamble, bet or wager
upon anything whatever." Surely
it would require no stretch of the
imagination to include betting on
horse races within these words. In
Gillock v. People, 171 Ill. 307, 49
N. E. 712 (1898), the Illinois court
sustained a conviction of burglary
of a henhouse under a statute enu-
merating a dwelling house, kitchen,
office, shop, storehouse, or any
other building. See also Common-
wealth v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 124
Ky. 497, 99 S. W. 596 (1907); State
v. Eckhart, 332 Mo. 49, 133 S. W.
321 (1910).
The dissent makes the startling
statement that this defendant
would be guilty of no crime, saying
that he could not be prosecuted
under the special statute. That
Article applies only to an "owner,
agent or lessee" of property used
for gambling on races. The evi-
dence in this case showed that de-
fendant was not an owner, agent
or lessee, but was only "keeping"
the premises and thus could not be
guilty under that law. If this be
true, then the majority overlooked
a serious defect in the special stat-
ute, for in many cases it would be
next to impossible to prove that
one who only kept a gambling place
was an owner, agent or lessee.
A reasonable correlation of the
two articles would be that the leg-
islature had left it to the discre-
tion of the prosecutor to determine
under which statute the accused
should be prosecuted. Choices of
statutes for framing indictments
are not uncommon. But under the
reasoning of the majority opinion
the prosecutor is forced to rely
upon the special statute (assuming
that he can prove accused was an
owner, agent or lessee). But since,
as stated by the dissent, "the vice
of gambling is so ruinous and the
denunciations of same so plain in
all our common law and statutory
utterances," a more practical solu-
tion might be fo allow prosecution
under the general statute with its
more severe penalties when war-
ranted by the facts of the partic-
ular case.
RUSSELL BUNDESEN.
